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In this paper we study the relationship between labor market institutions and
monetary policy. We use a simple macroeconomic framework to show how opti-
mal monetary policy rules depend on labor institutions (labor adjustment costs,
and nominal and real wage rigitidy) and social preferences regarding in‡ation,
employment, and real wages. We also calibrate our model to compute how the
change in social welfare brought about by giving up monetary policy as a result
of joining the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) depends on institutions and
preferences. We then use the calibrated model to analyze how EMU a¤ects the
incentives for labor market reform, both for reforms that increase the economy’s
adjustment potential and for those that a¤ect the long-run unemployment rate.
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11 Introduction
Over the last ten years, Europe has been engaged in a major policy project: monetary
union. At the same time, it has continued facing a major policy problem: unemploy-
ment. An ironical observer might therefore ask why so much political capital has been
spent on an arrangement that is so remote from the main problem at hand. The an-
swer belongs to politicians, but it is the economist’s task to study how monetary union
might change the way in which labor market policy is conceived. This question has two
sides. First, we may ask what is the best policy to reduce European unemployment,
and whether it is changed by Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Second, we may
take a more positive, political economy perspective and ask how the decisions that will
actually be taken in the …eld of labor market policy will be di¤erent from the ones that
would have been pursued absent EMU.
At face value, a well-trained economist would argue that EMU and labor market
policy are largely unrelated. The standard view holds that monetary policy does not
a¤ect real variables in the long run.1 Monetary union will a¤ect the member economies’
responses to asymmetric shocks, and, to the extent that the credibility of the European
Central Bank (ECB) is di¤erent from that of the original national central banks, their
common long-run in‡ation rate. But European unemployment, which has been high
for so long, is usually attributed to long-run real rigidities in wage setting, that prevent
real labor costs from adjusting downwards in order to eliminate unemployment. That
is, Europe’s problem is that the natural rate of unemployment is too high, whereas the
monetary stance only a¤ects short-run deviations from that natural rate. The …rst-
order answer is therefore that monetary union should not a¤ect labor market policy.
This argument, however, places too much emphasis on the long run. For private
agents that discount the future, the transition to a new long-run equilibrium is at
least as important as that new equilibrium. This is particularly so when one takes a
political economy perspective, as governments are short-lived and could not care less
about what the labor market will look like thirty years from now. The transition path
to a new equilibrium following a change in labor market policy will heavily depend on
the macroeconomic stance; monetary policy may play an important role in making the
transition better, or more acceptable to voters. An important e¤ect of EMU is that it
will remove that instrument from national governments, preventing them from using it
as an auxiliary policy instrument to deliver the best possible transition path to a new
1There exists however a line of thought that emphasizes hysteresis phenomena (Blanchard and
Summers, 1986, Gottfries and Horn, 1986), according to which a temporary aggregate demand shock
has permanent e¤ects on unemployment, that is, it changes the natural rate of unemployment forever.
However, the mechanisms that have been proposed for such hysteresis have been dismissed as too weak
to generate permanent e¤ects of temporary shocks (Layard, Nickell and Jackman, 1991). Rather, they
increase the time it takes for actual unemployment to return to the natural rate following an aggregate
demand shock.
2natural rate of unemployment.
National monetary policies also help to insulate one country from a shock occur-
ring in other countries. In this respect, while convergence has been achieved in …scal
and monetary indicators, and while steps have been taken to impose convergence of
future …scal policies, labor market policies have not been harmonized and will remain
largely idiosyncratic.2 This re‡ects in great part divergence of views about the causes
of unemployment and the appropriate remedies (compare, for example, the reforms un-
dertaken in the UK and those undertaken in France), which implies that labor market
policy will be a source of asymmetric shocks within EMU. These shocks will spillover
from the country where they occur to other countries, and will generate con‡icts be-
tween countries over the appropriate monetary response from the ECB. Indeed, such
a shock, and not a small one, has happened just one year after EMU took o¤, namely
the introduction of the 35-hour workweek in France in January 2000.
In this paper we analyze the relationship between labor market reform and mone-
tary policy in connection with EMU. We start by providing a short survey which allows
us to place our analysis in relation to the (scant) existing literature on EMU and la-
bor market policy (Section 2). We then introduce a simple macroeconomic framework
allowing us to characterize optimal monetary policy when performed at the national
level (Section 3). We then examine how such policy depends on the type of labor
institutions and social preferences de…ned over various objectives –employment, real
wages, and in‡ation– prevailing in the economy (Section 4). Characterizing EMU as
the inability to carry out country-speci…c monetary policy and calibrating both labor
institutions and policy preferences allows us to …nd how each type of institution modi-
…es the welfare cost entailed by joining EMU. Interestingly, no general proposition can
be established saying that rigidities are always harmful under EMU. Whether a given
institution is more costly or more bene…cial under EMU than under a sovereign mone-
tary policy depends on social preferences. On the basis of these results, we then assess
how EMU modi…es the incentives for labor market reform (Section 5). We distinguish
between reforms which only improve the economy’s dynamic adjustment potential with
no long-run e¤ects, from those which also lower the steady-state unemployment rate.
For the latter we …nd that while EMU clearly makes sizable reforms harder, it may
make small reforms easier. We end with a set of conclusions (Section 6).
It is worth advancing our main policy conclusions:
² EMU creates incentives to alter the economy’s structure in order to improve
its response to shocks. However, depending on which institution one is talking
about, and on the country’s preferences, this may well lead to more rigid labor
markets. For example, employment protection destabilizes prices but it stabilizes
employment. EMU increases the incentives to get rid of employment protection
2See Bean et al. (1998) for evidence and discussion.
3except if society cares a lot about stabilizing employment, in which case it would
actually create incentives to tighten employment protection legislation—this does
not occur in our simulations but it could for governments that put a high weight
on employment.
² EMU reduces the incentives for a large scale reform of the labor market that
would substantially lower unemployment, because monetary policy is very useful
in order to get the best possible transition path to the new equilibrium. Conse-
quently, we expect more timid reforms to prevail under EMU.
² Optimal monetary policy at the time of a labor reform involves a sharp deprecia-
tion in the short run, which speeds the transition toward the higher employment
level. This is consistent with the two-handed approach view, according to which
macroeconomic stimulus should accompany structural reforms.
² In this respect, an important limitation to structural reforms under EMU is their
potential de‡ationary impact. If de‡ation is to be avoided, the maximum size of
a reform will be smaller the lower the common trend of in‡ation in the monetary
union.
² Finally, to overcome the disincentive e¤ects of EMU on labormarket reform, there
is a case for coordination of labormarket reforms across European countries. This
will allow the ECB to engineer a monetary expansion in the Union at the same
time as all member countries engage in structural reforms, thus implementing the
two-handed approach at the union-wide level.
2 Literature on EMU and labor market reform
Until recently, most macroeconomic work on EMU has revolved around its desirability
and viability. The traditional discussion hasfocused on two issues. First, whetherEMU
member countries did or did not satisfy the classic conditions established by Mundell
(1961) for an optimum currency area –e.g. labor mobility, wage and price ‡exibility,
and the presence of …scal transfers from a central authority–, whose non-ful…llment
could create problems in the event of asymmetric shocks. Second, the determinants
of the likelihood that those shocks will happen.3 Except for the four European Union
(EU) countries currently outside EMU, that discussion seems dated. As of 2000, EMU
is up and running, and the most likely scenario is that it will be viable. It is time to
move on to the issue of how EMU will a¤ect macroeconomic developments in the Euro
countries.
3See Bean (1992) or Wyplosz (1997).
4Since EMU entails a change in a monetary arrangement, it is natural to expect
it to a¤ect mostly nominal variables, such as the level of in‡ation or the degree of
nominal wage inertia. In‡ation is likely to be low, in view of the mandate for price
stability enshrined in the statute of the ECB. The current EMU-wide in‡ation target
of the ECB is a band going from zero to 2%. As to nominal wage inertia, there are
theoretical predictions either way, as Calmfors (1998) has noted. It will decrease if the
lack of response of the ECB to country-speci…c shocks leads to larger demand shocks on
average, and this induces wage setters to shorten wage contract periods. Inertia may
however increase due to resistance to money-wage cuts in a low in‡ation environment,
for various reasons (for instance, coordination failures, hold-out clauses, or social norms
about fairness). Empirically, both Calmfors (1998) and Burda (1999) present informal
evidence suggesting a trend towards increased nominal wage ‡exibility.
But EMU may have real, rather than just nominal, e¤ects as well.4 Some e¤ects
would be direct. For example, EMU may increase the degree of competition in Eu-
ropean labor markets, through increased economic integration. The single currency
has reduced transaction costs and suppressed exchange rate volatility, both of which
should increase trade ‡ows among EMU member countries. It also increases trans-
parency about price di¤erentials across countries, which should enhance competition
throughout the Euro zone. Both channels should increase the wage elasticity of labor
demand and as a result weaken the bargaining power of labor unions, which should
itself yield higher real wage ‡exibility.5 One may be skeptical about direct e¤ects,
because they depend on EMU leading to signi…cantly higher trade ‡ows than those al-
ready spurred by the European Single Market which started in 1993. It can be argued
that the trade e¤ects of EMU might not be very large, in view of the small empirically
estimated e¤ects of exchange rate volatility on trade.6
Also, Danthine and Hunt (1994) have pointed out that a single product market in
the EU implies a de facto reduction of the degree of centralization of wage bargains.
This may change the trade-o¤s faced by wage setters in countries with very centralized
bargaining, like Scandinavian ones. This ‡attening out of the Calmfors-Dri¢ll (1988)
hump shape –as Burda (1999) puts it– means that it may not be so advantageous to
have a nation-wide bargain any more, and this could shake collective bargaining in EU
countries towards more decentralized structures.7
Recent work has focused on indirect, rather than direct, links, through which EMU
4A discussion of the range of potential e¤ects of EMU on European unemployment appears in
Viñals and Jimeno (1998).
5See Andersen and Sorensen (1993) for a theoretical model about this channel, and Andersen et
al. (2000) for a discussion of other channels.
6See Commission of the European Communities (1990). Nevertheless, Rose (2000) claims that a
currency union has further, much stronger trade e¤ects.
7Cukierman and Lippi (1999) argue that European labor unions will become more agressive as a
result of EMU, because the e¤ects of their actions will be diluted in the EMU-wide labor market.
5might lead governments to modify labor market regulations. Let us brie‡y spell out the
steps of the argument, since they are partly relevant to our story too. Persistently high
unemployment rates have characterized most continental European countries since the
1970s, with the average unemployment rate in the 11 Euro countries hovering around
10% in the last 15 years of the century. The currently leading hypothesis is that high
structural unemployment rates can be explained, to a large extent, by the type of labor
market institutions prevailing in those countries, such as …ring costs, unemployment
bene…ts, collective bargaining regulations, etc. (see Layard et al., 1991, and Blanchard
and Wolfers, 1998).
In spite of both this academic view and the tremendous costs imposed by high
unemployment, most EU governments have been unable or unwilling to reform their
labor market institutions, or they have done so in a very slow and partial way.8 The
leading explanation for the lack of reform is that existing institutions represent a polit-
ical equilibrium. The recent political economy literature provides various mechanisms
through which deviating from that equilibrium entails signi…cant political costs which
serve to entrench it (see, e.g., Saint-Paul, 1996). An intriguing question is therefore
whether EMU, while bearing no direct relation to it, could help solve the European
unemployment problem, by providing an exogenous shock that will rock the status quo
in a way that favors reform.
Indeed, the conventional wisdom prevailing today is that EMU will eventually re-
move some barriers to laborreform. Governments of EMU countrieshave lost monetary
policy as a tool to o¤set economic shocks and they may also see their hands tied re-
garding …scal policy by the Stability and Growth Pact. Bean (1998) argues that once
the easy option to devalue their currency has been lost, they will have no alternative
but to try to make their economy more ‡exible through labor market reform. This is a
version of the TINA (There-Is-No-Alternative) argument which became famous in the
UK during the Thatcher years.
A few authors, however, provide arguments against this view. Both Sibert and
Sutherland (1997) and Calmfors (1998) do so by extending Barro and Gordon’s (1983)
well known monetary policy model, where governments dislike deviations of in‡ation
and unemployment from some target values, but cannot credibly commit on a pol-
icy rule. Labor market reform is costly for the government, presumably for political
reasons. But it is also desirable: it directly reduces equilibrium unemployment and,
because it also reduces the in‡ation bias (the reward from being able to surprise price
and wage setters), it ends up indirectly reducing in‡ation as well. In this sense, labor
reform yields a double dividend. Now, the ECB is not guided by the in‡ation and
unemployment rates of a particular country, but by (some) EMU averages. Then the
8See, e.g., Bertola and Ichino (1995) or Saint-Paul (1996). The UK and The Netherlands can be
considered as exceptions to this rule. See Nickell and van Ours (2000) for a description of the labor
markets in these two countries.
6marginal bene…t from labor reform is smaller inside than outside EMU, because un-
employment in an individual member country has a smaller impact on the monetary
policy of the ECB than it had on the national central bank’s policy, and thereby a
lower impact on EMU-wide equilibrium unemployment and in‡ation rates as well. The
prediction is, therefore, that there will be less reform as a result of EMU.
There exist other arguments for why labor reform may be either easier or harder
inside than outside EMU. Bean (1998) points out that it might be harder if the costs
from reform come upfront while the bene…ts take longer to materialize.9 In such case,
outside EMU monetary policy can be used to ease short-run costs, so that reform is
viable in the …rst place, but not inside EMU. On the other hand, in the absence of an
in‡ation bias, there is a stronger incentive for labor reform inside EMU if policymakers
wish to avoid very bad outcomes regarding unemployment (i.e., they have a precau-
tionary motive), since the ECB does not stabilize country-speci…c shocks (Calmfors et
al., 1997).
Finally, Saint-Paul and Wasmer (1999) study national labor market policies as the
outcome of a strategic game between national governments and the European Central
Bank, so that the multi-country aspect of EMU plays a key role.
Our model di¤ers from the ones discussed so far in several respects. First, we explic-
itly distinguish among di¤erent labor market rigidities. More speci…cally, we make a
distinction between four kind of rigidities: those which increase the ability of incumbent
employees to get rents, those which reduce the response of real wages to labor market
disequilibrium, those which increase nominal inertia in wage setting, and those which
increase the cost of adjusting employment. We show that they have di¤erent impacts
on the cost of belonging to EMU, or, conversely, that EMU membership a¤ects the
incentives for labor market reform in di¤erent directions depending on which type of
rigidity we are considering. Second, we incorporate political economy considerations in
our analysis by allowing social preferences to re‡ect incumbent employees’ (or unions’)
preferences for real wage stability. Third, we relax the assumption that only long-run
in‡ation and unemployment outcomes matter and take into account the role of mone-
tary policy in the transition between steady states. In this way, our approach re‡ects
the two arguments put forth by Bean (1998), as just discussed. Fourth, we calibrate a
set of parameters which proxy for the di¤erent labor market institutions, so as to gauge
the likely importance of contending channels.10 Finally, we de-emphasize the role of
monetary policy credibility by assuming that even absent EMU, the government can
precommit on a monetary policy rule. This assumption re‡ects our belief that absent
EMU, governments would have used other devices to achieve credibility, such as central
bank independence, which already existed in many countries before they joined EMU.
9This argument is inspired in the well-known two-handed approach to European unemployment
defended by Blanchard et al. (1986).
10Bean (1998) provides a related numerical simulations for the UK on the e¤ects of a generic labor
reform which reduces the long-run unemployment rate.
73 A simple macroeconomic framework
3.1 Macroeconomic setup
Before dealing with EMU, it is necessary to set up a framework that speaks to the
largely untouched issue of the links between monetary policy and labor market policy.
Such framework can then be used to analyze what happens if monetary policy is decided
by a supra-national central bank rather than a national one.
We shall use a simple Aggregate Demand/Aggregate Supply model consisting of
the following equations:
yt = ±(et ¡ pt) + "t (1)
yt = lt + h + µt (2)
pt = wt ¡ µt ¡ h + ¸(lt ¡ lt¡1) + ¯¸(lt ¡ Etlt+1) (3)
wt = (1 ¡®)(q + (1 ¡')pt + 'et + °lt) + ®(wt¡1 + pt¡1 ¡ pt¡2) (4)
where y denotes output, e the nominal exchange rate (with an increase in e meaning a
depreciation), p the price level, w the nominal wage, h a productivity index which may
also re‡ect hours of work per employee, and l employment, all of them in logs, while
E denotes the expectations operator.
Equation (1) is the IS curve, which is reduced to its simplest determinants. The
parameter ± jointly captures the elasticity of imports and exports to the real exchange
rate and the degree of openness of the economy. "t is an aggregate demand shock with
zero mean and variance ¾2
". We take the nominal exchange rate as our policy variable,
which allows us to ignore the LM curve and makes it easier to extend the model to
a monetary union case. We have not introduced interest rates either.11 In fact, the
econometric evidence suggests that interest rates do not play a major role in the IS
curve.12
Equation (2) is the production function, which says that output is equal to em-
ployment times hours times productivity. Note that we have ignored the dynamics of
capital accumulation.
Equation (3) sets the price equal to the marginal cost of labor.13 The term ¸(lt ¡
lt¡1) represents current marginal labor adjustment costs: the more employment grows
11At the very least, introducing them would require the use of the interest parity condition: it =
i¤ + Etet+1 ¡ et: This would complicate the dynamics unless the path of future expected exchange
rates is ‡at, in which case equation (1) simply amounts to a normalization of the foreign nominal
interest rate to zero. Note also that there is little evidence in favor of uncovered interest parity (see
Obstfeld and Rogo¤, 1997).
12It is usually hard to …nd signi…cant e¤ects of real interest rates in consumption and investment
equations, and the sign of the estimated coe¢cient often crucially depends on the country and the
period. See the surveys on consumption, Muellbauer (1993), and investment, Chirinko (1993).
13There could be a constant markup on marginal cost, which is implicitly normalized to one.
8relative to past employment, the greater the marginal cost of labor and the greater the
price.14 Hence, ¯¸(lt¡Etlt+1) represents future discounted marginal labor adjustment
costs, with ¯ as the discount factor. µ is a productivity shock with zero mean and
variance ¾2
µ.
Finally, equation (4) represents wage setting behavior. Wages are a weighted aver-
age of past wages and current wage aspirations. Past wage contracts are assumed to
include a cost of living adjustment, hence the lagged in‡ation term (which leads to an
accelerationist Phillips curve). Wage aspirations include a rent or wage markup, q, on
the consumption wage and are an increasing function of employment –thus capturing
a positive feedback from labor market tightness to wage setting–. The parameter '
captures the weight of imported goods in the consumer price index.
Labor market policies and institutions are captured by several variables:
1. q re‡ects wage pressure, or insider bargaining power. The higher q, the higher the
rent that incumbent employees can grab on the job. q can also be interpreted as
capturing any outside factor that boosts wages, such as unemployment bene…ts.
2. ° re‡ects real wage ‡exibility, that is, how much wages respond to outside labor
market conditions. The lower °, the more insiders can insulate wage setting from
outside labor market conditions.
3. ¸ re‡ects labor adjustment costs (hiring and …ring costs), which are in part deter-
mined by regulation. Employment protection legislation and hiring regulations,
such as the prohibition of temporary work agencies or the establishment of a
compulsory priority hiring list, all increase ¸.
4. ® is the degree of nominal wage rigidity. Following Taylor (1980) and Calvo
(1983), it may re‡ect the fraction of nominal wage contracts that are not renego-
tiated in any given period. It may also re‡ect social norms against nominal wage
cuts, as documented in Bewley (1998) and Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry (1996).
® is to some extent a¤ected by policy regarding contract length, backward in-
dexation, etc. Finally, we can also interpret it as representing the importance of
minimum wages, assuming that these are indexed on last period’s average nom-
inal wage. Under this interpretation, ® would be the fraction of workers being
paid the minimum wage.
One di¢culty is that these parameters do not correspond exactly to real-world labor
market institutions. For example, …ring costs will increase the adjustment cost ¸, but
at the same time they are likely to increase workers’ bargaining power (Lindbeck and
Snower, 1988), thus increasing q and possibly reducing °.
14This is again quite standard (see Layard et al., 1991, ch. 9).
93.2 Monetary policy
We now turn to the speci…cation of the objective function of the policymaker. The
standard practice, following Barro and Gordon (1983), is to assume that the govern-
ment cares about output and in‡ation. We depart from standard practice by allowing
public decisions to be a¤ected by pressure groups representing the interests of incum-







where r is the discount rate and Us the instantaneous utility function, given by:
Us = ¡½[ws ¡ (1 ¡ ')ps ¡ 'es ¡ ´h ¡$
¤]









where ¼t ´ pt ¡ pt¡1 denotes the in‡ation rate, $¤ the union’s desired level for its
objective, and l¤ the government’s employment level objective.15
The …rst term in brackets re‡ects the political power of insiders (as opposed to their
bargaining power re‡ected in parameters q and °). The utility of insiders depends on
their real consumption wage and their leisure, i.e. it is decreasing in hours of work.
The second term is the usual social welfare function in terms of in‡ation and output,
except that, given supply shocks, it makes more sense to use employment rather than
output.16 The parameter b captures the weight of in‡ation in this welfare function.
The union objective and the welfare function come with weights ½ and 1 ¡ ½, with ½
therefore measuring the political power of incumbent employees.
3.3 Long- and short-run equilibria
This model allows us to describe the exchange rate policy followed by the government
under various hypotheses and to see how it depends on labor market institutions. The
…rst step is however to characterize the solution as a function of the monetary policy
followed. Assuming astationary monetary policy rule, real variableswill ‡uctuate along
their long-term averages, which are computed by setting all shocks to zero, current
values equal to past values, and expectations equal to realizations for all variables.
They are given by:
¹ l =
(± ¡ ')h ¡ ±q
' + °±
; ¹ ! = h; ¹ x =
(1 + °)h ¡ q
' + °±
; and ¹ y = ±
(1 + °)h ¡ q
' + °±
15While originally posed in ad-hoc manner, the social welfare function of Barro and Gordon (1983)
can be derived as a second-order approximation within a utility-maximizing framework. See Rotem-
berg and Woodford (1997) and Erceg et al. (1999).
16There is no a priori reason why a benevolent policymaker would like to stabilize output in the
face of supply shocks. In the …rst best, full employment outcome output should react one for one with
supply shocks, if labor supply is inelastic.
10where, hereafter, we de…ne xt ´ et¡pt as the real exchange rate and !t = wt¡pt as the
real (product) wage. Note that we can express the solution in terms of x and !. The
in‡ation rate is equal to the exogenous trend of nominal depreciation, which we assume
is equal to zero (under commitment this is optimal, since there is no long run trade-o¤
between in‡ation and real variables). Thus: ¹ ¼ = 0. The price level is indeterminate
unless there is a nominal anchor, which is obviously the case under EMU. However
with a national monetary policy it is not optimal to have a nominal anchor, since it is
in‡ation and not the price level that appears in the objective function in equation (6).
The short-run equilibrium can be solved by using standard rational expectations
techniques. We proceed in two steps. First, we assume there is a pre-set monetary
policy rule and then solve for the state variables of the model –as deviations from their
long-run equilibrium values–, whose expressions are functions of the policy parameters.
Second, given this relationship, we derive the parameters of the optimal policy rule.
The details are in Appendix 1 and further discussion is provided in the next section.
4 Labor institutions and optimal monetary policy
We aim at …nding out how optimal monetary policy depends on labor market insti-
tutions. The non-linear way in which the parameters enter the solution for both the
endogenous variables and the policy rule leads us to calibrate all the parameters, so
that they are deemed to be representative of OECD economies, and then solve numer-
ically for the optimal policy rule. We start by justifying the parameter choices made,
we then brie‡y discuss the procedure for …nding the optimal monetary policy, and we
…nally present the simulation results.
4.1 Calibration of parameters
4.1.1 Labor market institutions and political economy parameters
We need to choose values for the parameters capturing labor adjustment costs, real
wage ‡exibility, and nominal inertia (¸, °, and ®, respectively) that characterize the
state of the labor market. For each of the parameters we choose two values, one
representing a ‡exible economy and the other a rigid one. These values are based
essentially on the estimates of Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991) for 19 OECD
countries over the period 1969-85. These authors also provide simple cross-section
regressions of the country-speci…c coe¢cients on several proxies for the a priori relevant
institutions with reasonably favorable results.
Out of the 19 countries for which they provide estimated parameters, we compute
the averages over the countries showing the upper and lower values so as to de…ne the
rigid and ‡exible economies (respectively, lower and upper in the case of °). These
11average values turn out to be quite similar across various empirical studies.17 Table 1
shows our calibrated parameters (see Appendix 2 for details).
Our parameter space therefore de…nes eight virtual economies, each of them being
labeled in Table 2 with an appropriate nickname. Although the parameter ranges are
quite similar across empirical studies, the rankings of countries with regard to speci…c
parameters are not so similar. Thus, we must exercise some judgement in the choice
of nicknames. Bruno and Sachs (1985) established the stylized fact of the US having
nominal wage rigidity and real wage ‡exibility, while both continental Europe and the
UK had the opposite.18 We take Scandinavian countries to be more like the US in this
respect and Japan to enjoy overall ‡exibility. As to labor adjustment costs, we only
label the UK and the US as being ‡exible.
As to social preferences, we know of no evidence regarding the union political in-
‡uence parameter ½ and, more surprisingly, of little evidence regarding the in‡ation
aversion parameter b. A ballpark estimate for b in 22 OECD countries is 0.74 (from
Lippi, 1998, see Appendix 2). We choose two alternative values for each of ½ and b. We
characterize economies as having either politically weak unions (½ = 0:1) or politically
strong unions (½ = 0:5). With respect to in‡ation, they can be either in‡ation averse
(b = 0:9) or in‡ation prone (b = 0:1). In order to streamline the discussion below, we
also give nicknames to the resulting combinations, as shown in Table 3. We call an
in‡ation-averse government with a low in‡uence of labor unions ”Conservative” and
one with a high in‡uence ”Christian Democrat”, while an in‡ation-prone government
with a low in‡uence of unions is dubbed ”New Labour” and one with a high in‡uence
is called ”Socialist”. Hereafter we shall refer to these as policymaker types. We will
dispose of the inverted commas from now on, but it should be kept in mind that these
nicknames are simply useful shorthand.
4.1.2 Other parameters
We also need to quantify a few other parameters (see Appendix 2 for details). Both
the real exchange rate elasticity ± and the price weight of imports ' are set to 0.2,
following estimates and data averages for OECD countries. The rent q a¤ects averages
but not the response to shocks, and therefore does not a¤ect optimal monetary policy.
Thus we set it to zero for now. It will play a key role, however, when we consider the
incentives for labor reform in EMU.
Two important parameters characterize the degree of noise in the economy, namely
the shock variances ¾2
" and ¾2
µ. For our simulations we adopt Bayoumi and Eichen-
green’s (1993) estimates of the standard deviation of demand and supply shocks, de-
17In particular, we check the estimates against those of Alogoskou…s and Manning (1988), Grubb
(1986), and Newell and Symons (1985).
18See also the cross-country results for an alternative measure of real wage ‡exibility in Viñals and
Jimeno (1998).
12rived from a structural vector autoregression (VAR). Their estimates suggest the values
¾2
" = ¾2
µ = 0:0004. We must however note that these variances should be sensitive to
which assumptions are made in identifying the VAR.
We need also describe the remaining preference parameters appearing in the utility
function (6). The desired long-run objectives are set to $¤ = 1 and l¤ = 0:1. With
a long-run equilibrium (log) employment level of ¹ l = 0 these values imply that there
is an unwanted unemployment rate of 10%. The interest rate entering the objective
function is set to 0.1 (and accordingly ¯ to 0.9) . Lastly, although our model would
allow us to study the e¤ects of changes in hours of work, we will not discuss this issue
further, and so from now on we set hours of work h to zero.
4.2 Optimal policy rule
Our space of 5 parameters with 2 alternative values each de…nes 32 alternative virtual
economies.19 For each of these we compute the optimal monetary policy in steady
state. By steady state we mean that at date t = 0 –when the monetary policy rule is
chosen to maximize the objective function in equation (5)– the initial values of prices,
employment, and wages are equal to their long-run average levels.
In Appendix 1 it isshown that the optimal monetary policy determineseach period’s
real exchange rate as a function of the three relevant state variables—employment, real
wages, and in‡ation—in the preceding period, and the two current shocks—"t and µt:
That is,
^ xt = x0^ lt¡1 + x1^ !t¡1 + x2^ ¼t¡1 + x3"t + x4µt; (7)
where a hat denotes deviations from steady-state values.20
Optimal policy is de…ned in terms of the set of parameters xi = fx0;x1;x2;x3;x4g,
each of which may be either positive or negative. It is optimal for monetary policy to
react to past deviations of employment, real wages, and in‡ation from their long-run
equilibrium levels, and also to current aggregate demand and supply shocks. Simulta-
neously stabilizing employment, real wages, and in‡ation will usually entail con‡icts
which the xi coe¢cients resolve as a function of the weights given to these objectives
in equation (6).
19Labor market institutions should be endogenous to social preferences, and so some of the combi-
nations considered might not be politically viable. For simplicity, we shall disregard this issue in our
analysis.
20Hence, even though the policy variable being used is the nominal exchange rate, the rule is
expressed in terms of the real one. The corresponding nominal exchange rate is determined implicitly
by (7).
134.3 Monetary policy, labor institutions and policy objectives
Table 4 presents the results from our simulations for the di¤erent combinations of
policymaker preferences and labor market con…gurations. Our goal is to describe how
the cost of joining EMU depends on an economy’s labor market institutions. We de…ne
EMU as …xing the nominal exchange rate irrevocably, i.e.: xi = 0, for i = 1;:::;5. In
other words, monetary policy cannot respond to the developments in the economy. To
the extent to which supply and demand shocks in any particular country are correlated
with those in the other EMU member countries, EMU monetary policy will be partially
geared towards in‡ation and employment developments in each country. This degree
of gearing should be expected to vary over time. While our characterization of EMU
is an extreme one, it has the advantage of bringing out the relationship between the
costs of EMU and labor market structure in sharp relief. But it should be kept in mind
that the costs from EMU that we compute are an upper bound on the ones that would
arise if any cross-country correlation in macroeconomic aggregates was considered.
The welfare cost associated with EMU is given by the di¤erence between the pol-
icymaker’s welfare with the optimal policy and that under EMU. If all the structural
parameters characterizing the economy remain constant, then in our model this cost
is clearly always positive, since the optimal monetary policy improves over any alter-
native. Thus, to justify EMU from a welfare perspective we would have to assume the
existence of some gain from EMU which is not formalized in our model (e.g. a political
gain or a reduction in transaction costs). This choice is consistent with the fact that,
as indicated in Section 2, the sorts of structural changes to be brought forth by EMU
are unclear. We nevertheless analyze at the end of this section how our results change
if we allow for one gain from EMU which is plausible to expect, namely a reduction in
the variance of demand shocks.
Let us nowdiscussTable4. The valuesreported are thecostsfromEMU, namely the
di¤erence between the welfare losses for a country with a given set of labor institutions
and preferences inside EMU and those outside EMU. In order to properly compare
welfare losses across economies with di¤erent preferences (i.e. ½ and b) we normalize
each loss by the present discounted value of the steady state utility corresponding to
the speci…c preference pair.21
The …rst result is that, ironically, the countries that lose less from EMU are of the
Anglo-Saxon type, i.e. the UK and the US, while the ones that lose most are the Fully
Rigid economy and Scandinavia, closely followed by Europe and Japan. This is true
across preference structures. This conclusion is of course worth what our nicknames
are.
The table allows us to explain these di¤erences by tracing them back to the e¤ects of
speci…c labor market institutions on the cost of EMU. For each, we present the average
21Which is given by [(1 +r)=r][½($¤)
2 +(1 ¡½)(1 ¡b)(l¤)
2].
14cost of EMU for the four economies with a rigid institution and for the four with a
‡exible one, and then the average rigid-‡exible di¤erence. Let us start with the labor
adjustment cost index ¸. Table 4 shows that having a rigid employment protection
legislation, say, instead of a ‡exible one increases the cost of belonging to EMU for
all policymaker types. To see why, we need to examine how these costs a¤ect the
variances of the three variables included in the objective function (6).22 As expected,
higher labor adjustment costs stabilize employment but destabilize both prices and
real wages. With our parameter space, the former e¤ect is much smaller than the
latter two, and so employment rigidity always raises the cost of EMU, for any type
of policymaker preferences. There are quantitative di¤erences, however: not being
able to use monetary policy to o¤set those higher variances is particularly costly for a
Conservative. The reason is that this type of policymaker cares a lot about in‡ation
(b is high) and, even though it does not care much about the real wage variance (½ is
low), the destabilization of prices is much larger than that of wages, yielding an overall
lower welfare.23
This does not mean that any rigidity increases the cost of EMU. Consider for
example real wage ‡exibility °. Table 4 indicates that having rigid real wages actually
reduces the cost of EMU –with the exception of the Socialist policymaker–, although
the di¤erence is small relative to the case of labor adjustment costs. The reason is that
a lower ° stabilizes prices, while destabilizing employment and real wages. While we
may have expected a lower ° to lower the variance of real wages as well, the opposite
obtains in general equilibrium under EMU through the higher employment variance,
despite the fact that a lower ° reduces the response of wage aspirations to changes in
employment (cfr. equation (4)). This makes a higher wage rigidity more costly under
EMU the higher is political union power. Given its price stabilization e¤ect, EMU is
on the other hand less costly the higher the degree of in‡ation aversion. As a result,
only with a combination of a high union weight plus a low in‡ation weight (e.g. the
Socialist policymaker case) can rigid real wages make EMU more costly than having
‡exible wages.
Finally, let us consider nominal wage inertia, ®. Rigidity entails a higher welfare
cost underEMU forin‡ation-prone policymakers, while the opposite is true for in‡ation
averse ones. Why? Because nominal wage rigidity stabilizes prices but destabilizes
employment and real wages. Thus nominal wage rigidity has the same variance e¤ects
as real wage rigidity but, as would be natural to expect, it raises the variance of real
wages (vis-a-vis ‡exible nominal wages) signi…cantly more than real rigidity does. As
a result, within countries with high nominal wage rigidity, EMU is costly not just for
those with politically powerful unions (Socialist) but also marginally for those with
22These variance e¤ects are reported in Table A2 of Appendix 3.
23Note that the Christian Democrat policymaker is in‡ation averse as well, but the overall weight
of in‡ation is much lower because of the higher weight now placed on real wage stability (½ = 0:5),
with the net result of a lower loss than for the Conservative one.
15weak unions too (New Labour).
So far we have computed the costs associated with EMU for di¤erent labor market
and preference structures, which amounts to assuming that those structures will remain
una¤ected by EMU. One of the variables which may however be directly lowered by
EMU is the degree of uncertainty. In reality, a fraction of demand shocks arises from
speculation in foreign currency markets. Since EMU suppresses all variation in bilateral
exchange rates, it is natural to assume it will reduce the variance of demand shocks.
We therefore check the robustness of our results by re-running our simulations for the
case in which EMU lowers that variance by one-third. In this particular choice we
follow Canzoneri et al. (1996) (see Appendix 2).
The reduction in the variance has two e¤ects, with respect to the case of an un-
changed variance.24 First, with lower variability, the costs from EMU are reduced in
all cases. Second, the reduction in the demand shock variance means that the increase
in the variance of real wages caused by nominal wage rigidity is lower than before, so
that such rigidity now reduces the cost of EMU even in the New Labour case. Overall,
however, the qualitative results are unchanged.
To conclude, both the cost of EMU and the impact of speci…c labor market in-
stitutions on this cost crucially depend on the policymaker’s preferences. Stringent
employment protection legislation tends to increase the cost of EMU, especially for a
Conservative policymaker. On the other hand, nominal and real wage rigidity may re-
duce the cost of EMU as long as the combination of low in‡ation aversion and politically
powerful unions –the Socialist case– does not prevail. These results are summarized in
Table 5, both for individual policy objectives and for the combinations of them which
we have been considering. In the table, a ”+” sign (respectively ”–”) indicates that
a more rigid institution increases (respectively reduces) the cost from EMU member-
ship when the policymaker’s objective is to stabilize the variable in the corresponding
column.
When thinking about the impact of a given labor market institution on the cost of
EMU, it is useful to think in terms of substitutability between that institution and the
use of active monetary policy. If it is substitute, then having more of it reduces the
cost of EMU membership. Substitutability depends both on the institution and public
preferences. For example, if one wants to stabilize in‡ation, employment protection is a
poor substitute since it increases the volatility of marginal costs. Therefore, it increases
the costs of EMU membership for an in‡ation-averse policymaker. By contrast, it is
a good substitute for monetary policy if one wants to stabilize employment; in this
case more employment protection should reduce the cost of EMU. However, as we have
seen, the employment stabilizing e¤ect is quite small so that even with b = 0:1 this
e¤ect does not show up in our simulations. Furthermore, the stabilizing e¤ect of an
institution in general equilibrium may be quite di¤erent from its direct e¤ect. At face
24The results are reported in Table A3 of Appendix 3.
16value, greater real wage rigidity should lower the volatility of real wages, and therefore
it should reduce the cost of EMU when unions are strong. However, it turns out that
in general equilibrium a lower ° actually increases real wage volatility, so that the
conclusion is reversed.
Interestingly, there is no general proposition telling us that labor market rigidity
makes EMU more costly. It all depends on public preferences and the speci…c rigidity
we are talking about. However, acasual reading of the experience of European countries
in the 1980’s and 1990’s suggests that, during the convergence process to EMU, social
preferences have drifted from output and employment stability to price level stability.
According to our results, given the level of employment protection in these countries,
we would expect such a shift to increase the cost of EMU.25
5 Labor market reform and EMU
The preceding section tellsus what isthe cost, on average, of losing monetary autonomy
for an economy that stays with the same labor market institutions. In this section,
we consider the issue from a more dynamic perspective, looking at the cost of EMU
for an economy which considers a change in its institutions. Formally, we now look
for a policy rule that maximizes welfare under initial conditions that are given by the
di¤erence between the pre-reform and the post-reform steady states.26
We would expect that the more costly is EMU under a given institutional arrange-
ment, the greater the e¤ect of EMU on the incentives to reform that institution. For
example, we have seen that the burden of EMU is greater the larger the …ring cost.
Thus, we should logically expect the gains from reducing …ring costs to be higher under
EMU than absent EMU. This, in e¤ect, is the so-called TINA argument described in
Section 2 for the supposedly bene…cial impact of EMU on labor market reform. But
that reasoning ignores another aspect of monetary policy, namely that it can be used to
reduce the cost of the transition to the post-reform steady state, and this transitional
role is lost if the country belongs to a monetary union. This is the second argument
advanced by Bean (1998), as mentioned in Section 2. In fact, this latter aspect turns
out to be crucial, because labor market reform represents a large shock relative to the
standard deviation of demand and supply shocks, so that the transitional role tends to
25Alternatively, it might be argued that governments will care less about in‡ation inside EMU
because, having lost control of monetary policy, they will not be held accountable for domesticin‡ation.
We do not …nd this argument very persuasive, since in the end what matters is what the public cares
about.
26This can be seen as a way to tackle the Lucas critique, namely that estimated parameters char-
acterizing the past behavior of any economy should not be invariant to changes in policy variables.
Such critique is of course very relevant regarding a clear and important regime change like EMU. Our
approach is to use the model to provide an informed guess as to how the parameters characterizing
the economy will change once the monetary policy regime changes.
17be quantitatively more important than TINA.
We shall therefore distinguish between two types of reforms. The …rst one changes
the economy’s potential to adjust to shocks, but has no impact on its average long-
run equilibrium. If the economy starts at this equilibrium, labor reform therefore
does not induce any transitional dynamics of its own. The impact of EMU on reform
incentives can then simply be recovered from the steady state costs of the pre- and
post-reform institutions as calculated in the preceding section. The second type of
reform is associated with a change in the long-run average steady state of the economy.
In this case, the larger the e¤ect of reform on, say, employment, the greater the initial
post-reform deviation of employment from average steady-state values, and the greater
the value of using monetary policy along the transition path. In other words, EMU is
more likely to reduce incentives for reform the larger the reform. Thus, large reforms
are clearly harder under EMU, but some small reforms may be easier, a point we will
return to below.
In order to analyze speci…c reforms we compute the impact of EMU on reform
incentives, which is de…ned as follows:
I = (WRE ¡ W ¹ RE) ¡ (WR ¹ E ¡ W ¹ R ¹ E); (8)
= (Value of reform under EMU) – (Value of reform absent EMU)
where R (respectively ¹ R) stands for reform (respectively no reform), E (respectively ¹ E)
for EMU (respectively no EMU), and W is the corresponding value of the policymaker’s
objective function. We clearly also have:
I = (W ¹ R ¹ E ¡ W ¹ RE) ¡ (WR ¹ E ¡ WRE)
= (Cost of EMU absent reform) – (Cost of EMU under reform)
5.1 Increasing the economy’s adjustment potential
In the case of a change in one of the parameters that a¤ect the economy’s response
to shocks but not its long-run average levels of output, employment, and wages, the
reform generates no transitional dynamics if the actual initial values of these variables
are precisely equal to their long-run levels. In this case the policy rule following reform
only re‡ects the response to shocks and it is rigorous to use Table 4 to compute the
impact e¤ect I in equation (8). We follow this approach for three types of reforms:
a reduction in employment protection, a reduction in nominal wage inertia, and (in
a special case where it does not a¤ect long-term averages), an increase in real wage
‡exibility.
A reduction in …ring costs, ¸, might also lower insider workers’ bargaining power,
thus having at the same time a negative impact on q and possibly a positive impact
on °. However, let us proceed in steps and consider …rst the impact of a reduction
18in the employment inertia parameter ¸ alone (we analyze changes in q in the next
subsection).27 As indicated in Table 5(B), the average impact of EMU on the incentives
to reduce …ring costs from its rigid level of ¸ = 8 to its ‡exible one of ¸ = 1 is
positive for any government. The average di¤erences in welfare between countries
with rigid employment and those with ‡exible employment in Table 4 shows that this
incentiveisparticularly high forthe Conservative policymaker. Aspreviously discussed,
this happens because a high ¸ stabilizes employment but destabilizes both real wages
and prices, especially the latter, which is the pre-eminent objective for this type of
policymaker.
As to nominal wage inertia, ®, again the impact of EMU on reform incentives is
given by the welfare e¤ect of the change fromthe rigid level of ® = 0:8 to the ‡exible one
of ® = 0:45. Table 5(B) indicates that both a New Labour and a Socialist policymaker
would have an incentive to increase nominal wage ‡exibility under EMU. Again, the
reason is that nominal wage rigidity stabilizes prices but destabilizes real wages and
employment, with the latter objective being the one that those governments would like
to stabilize the most. Table 4 indicates that, with our parameter space, this incentive
is quite mild, specially in the case of New Labour (for which the incentive actually
disappears if EMU brings about a reduction of the variance of demand shocks).
Lastly, we can discuss real wage ‡exibility, °, in one particular case. If q (insider
rents) remains equal to zero, as we have been assuming until now, then an increase in °
does not a¤ect the long-term values of real wages, prices or employment –which remain
equal to zero–. In this case a higher ° means that real wages are more responsive to
shocks but the long-run level of employment remains the same. Then the impact of
EMU on reform incentives can be computed exactly as for the other two institutions.
Table 5(B) showsthat only forthe Socialist policymakerdoes EMUprovide an incentive
to increase °. This is because real wage rigidity (a lower °) stabilizes prices, while
destabilizing employment and real wages, and this particularly hurts a policymaker
which values employment stability. Within our parameter space, the incentive is again
mild.
5.2 Increasing the economy’s average performance
As already mentioned, whenever a reform changes the long-run average output and
employment level of the economy, the impact of transitional dynamics on welfare will
typically dwarf the contribution of shocks, because shocks are small relative to the
output and employment gaps generated by the reform. A corollary is that the optimal
27Even without having any impact on q or °, linear adjustment costs might still have an e¤ect on
steady-state employment, but the sign of this e¤ect is highly dependent on certain features of the
production function and the distribution function of shocks to it (see Bentolila and Bertola, 1990, and
Bentolila and Saint-Paul, 1994). In our case, labor adjustment costs are implicitly quadratic, so that
they clearly have no impact on average employment.
19monetary policy will in general be quite di¤erent from the steady-state one derived in
the previous section.
Consider now the prototypical case of a labor market reform that increases em-
ployment in the long run –e.g. reduces the natural rate of unemployment–, namely a
reduction in insiders’ rents, q. To streamline the discussion, let us limit ourselves to
a Neutral government, with no political power of insiders and with equal weights on
in‡ation and unemployment (i.e. ½ = 0 and b = 0:5). Moreover, we only report re-
sults for two alternative economies, Europe (rigid employment and real wages, ‡exible
nominal wages) and the Fully Flexible economy.
To illustrate how monetary policy plays an instrumental role in smoothing the
transition to a new steady state following reform, we compare the economy’s dynamic
response to the reform under EMU to what we get if the optimal monetary policy is
followed.
Let us start with the Fully Flexible economy. Figure 1 represents the response of
employment and real wages to a reduction in q by 0.1 under EMU (starting from our
benchmark of q = 0). Figure 2 plots the corresponding path for the price level. Under
EMU, labor market reform puts the economy in a situation similar to a recession in the
short run. The initial rate of unemployment is above the natural rate, which has fallen
because of the reform. This moderates wages so that employment increases, while the
induced moderation in prices createsa strongdisin‡ation which boostscompetitiveness.
The latter allows the economy to absorb the increase in productive capacity, but it is
indeed so rapid that employment ends up overshooting the long-run natural rate, and
in‡ation picks up again. Thus, under EMU, labor market reform (or any other shock)
induces oscillatory dynamics around the new steady state.
How would monetary policy react if it could be set optimally? Figure 3 plots the
optimal response of the nominal exchange rate and the path for the price level absent
EMU. The …rst years of the reform are marked by a rapid depreciation of the exchange
rate, which causes the same real depreciation as disin‡ation did in the previous case,
while also bringing the gains of greater price stability. As is apparent in Figure 4, the
optimal monetary policy implies a faster real depreciation in the short run than under
EMU, while it (almost) avoids the subsequent overshooting of the real exchange rate.
This is also true for employment (Figure 5), while the short-run fall in real wages is
greater than under EMU since there is much less of a disin‡ation. Note also that the
optimal policy is well approximated by a constant price-level rule, which is consistent
with bringing employment as quickly as possible to the new natural rate by means of
a sharp depreciation. The optimal monetary policy validates the so-called two-handed
approach, which claims that aggregate demand stimulus should go along with structural
reforms (see Blanchard et al., 1986, and Bean, 1998).
How do these results change for the economy with the labor market con…guration
we have called ”Europe”? Labor adjustment costs make employment overshooting less
severe, but it is still there under EMU and can be eliminated absent EMU (Figure
206). The optimal monetary policy is still a depreciation, but because of employment’s
greater inertia, it is less sharp and more spread over time than for the ‡exible economy
(Figure 7). Real wages fall more than in the ‡exible economy, because a greater fall in
labor costs is needed to get the same increase in employment, as labor adjustment costs
are higher. It is still true that the real wage drop is greater under the optimal policy
than under EMU (Figure 8). Finally, the optimal monetary policy is associated with a
slow reduction in the price level, while strong disin‡ation is observed in the EMU case
(Figure 9). Indeed, these simulations imply an in‡ation di¤erential, relative to the long-
run value of ¼ = 0, of around –6 % in the short run. If our parametric characterization
of the European economy is not wide o¤ the mark and we take it as a desirable goal
to avoid de‡ation, then this result suggests that the ECB’s target in‡ation rate of 2%
is too low in the sense that any individual country engaging in labor market reform
would have a de‡ation (see Blanchard and Jimeno, 1999, and Gros et al., 1999, for
related arguments). One solution to avoid this would be to have a target in‡ation
rate of about 6% instead of 2%. If this sounds unappealing, it should nevertheless be
kept in mind that there is a trade-o¤: for any EMU-wide in‡ation rate there exists a
maximum level of non-de‡ationary labor market reform (i.e. a maximum reduction in
q). The other solution is a coordinated labor market reform across the Euro countries,
with the ECB implementing the optimal monetary policy at the monetary union level.
We return to this issue below.
How does EMU membership a¤ect the incentives for reform? If there were no
shocks to the economy, then the cost of EMU membership would be zero absent labor
market reform. By contrast, it would be strictly positive for an economy that con-
siders reforming its labor market, since EMU precludes implementing the two-handed
approach. Things are more complex if there are shocks. In this case, it may be that
the optimal policy to accompany the reform o¤sets the one that stabilizes shocks, so
that less monetary activity is needed under reform than absent reform. If so, EMU
membership actually makes reform easier.28 This argument is however valid only if the
size of shocks is not too small relative to the size of the reform. Otherwise the e¤ect
of losing the two-handed approach is dominant. In other words, the reforms that are
facilitated by EMU membership are small reforms –of an order of magnitude similar to
the typical shock hitting the economy– while large reforms are discouraged.29 In the
case of the moderate reduction in q by 10% that we consider here and for the structural
parameters we have chosen, our calibrated variance of the shocks is not large enough
28The issue is as follows. We de…ne optimal policy as a pre-set response (the xi coe¢cients) to
deviations of variables from their steady-state values. With reform, however, setting a given dynamic
path for the exchange rate e would also be part of the optimal policy. Thus if, for instance, the optimal
policy without reform called for an xi > 0 but with reform it was optimal to have xi < 0 at a speci…c
date, then EMU (e.g. xi = 0) would be less costly with than without reform.
29Intuition suggests that similar results to those obtained for a reduction in q would arise for an
increase in ° in a setup with a nonzero q.
21for EMU to facilitate reform; the cost of EMU under reform is higher than the cost
of EMU absent reform, so that EMU reduces reform incentives. This is illustrated in
Table 6.
Note that the negative sign on the di¤erential cost I does not necessarily imply
that the reverse reform (an increase in q) would become more viable under EMU. A
change in any direction would require an activist monetary policy, so that the loss of
monetary autonomy reduces the incentives for reform either way. In this sense, EMU
need not aggravate Eurosclerosis –if de…ned as raising q–, but it clearly tends to foster
structural inertia.
To illustrate how EMU membership reduces the scope for reform, we have looked
at the welfare e¤ects of various sizes of reforms both absent EMU and under EMU, for
the same Neutral government. For the ”European” economy, assuming an initial rent
of q = 0:1; the reform which most increases welfare, absent EMU, is a reduction in the
rent q by 30%, i.e. a move to q = ¡0:2. By contrast, under EMU the reform which
most increases welfare is a reduction in q by 20%, i.e. a new value equal to q = ¡0:1.
Furthermore, the gain from reform, in welfare terms, is 8.8% absent EMU and 6.8%
under EMU. If we assume that there is an upfront cost of implementing the reform,
this implies that for a range of this cost (i.e. if it is greater than 6.8% but smaller than
8.8%), reform will take place absent EMU but not under EMU.
This result has one important implication. Policymakers of individual EMU mem-
ber countries considering whether to undertake a labor market reform, so as to achieve
lower equilibrium unemployment, will foresee that such reform will also deliver an idio-
syncratic, de‡ationary shock to their economies. EMU implies that monetary policy
will not be able to respond to such a shock so as to deliver the best possible transition
path to the new equilibrium. Given social preferences and reasonable time-discount
factors, the transition path under EMU may just be too costly in terms of welfare,
so that reform will not be undertaken in the …rst place. This proposition is clearly
strengthened if societies and/or policymakers have shorter e¤ective horizons (in other
words, a higher discount factor).
Is there a way out of the dilemma? Individual governments might be able to use
…scal, rather than monetary policy, to stimulate demand at the time of a labor reform.
This avenue however seems to be severely curtailed by the Stability and Growth Pact
(see Eichengreen and Wyplosz, 1998). Alternatively, if there was a common agreement
for carrying out labor market reforms across all EMU member countries, then the
ECB could accompany such reforms with the appropriate monetary policy. This type
of behavior is not as far-fetched as it may sound. For instance, in the US the Federal
Reserve was willing to adequately relax the monetary policy stance to go along with
the severe …scal consolidation undertaken by the Clinton Administration in the …rst
half of the 1990’s (see Blanchard, 1999, p. 92).
An important issue that would need to be addressed at some stage is that di¤erent
EMU member countries would need di¤erent types and intensities of labor market
22reform, and so they would get a correspondingly di¤erent dose of a de‡ationary impact
from reform. Trade and …nance links among countries would also make for asymmetric
impacts. While this aspect would need to be considered, it seems much more important
that it was widely understood that the overall tone of the ECB’s monetary policy would
not allow labor market reform to bring about a de‡ation in any country.
6 Conclusions
Most countries belonging to the European Union have experienced persistently high
unemployment rate in the last 25 years. The leading explanation attributes this phe-
nomenon to a few key labor market institutions in EU countries. On the other hand,
for 11 of the 15 EU countries, the most important institutional change at the turn
of the millennium has been the abandoning of national monetary policies in favor of
a European Central Bank. A natural and important question to ask is whether this
change in the monetary policy regime will either foster or hinder the reform of Euro
zone labor markets.
In this paper we analyze this issue in the context of a simple macroeconomic model.
We derive optimal, credible monetary policies from the maximization of a social welfare
function which takes into account not just long-run equilibrium magnitudes of in‡ation
and unemployment, but also the values of these variables at all times. More speci…cally,
it takes into account the adjustment path to equilibrium after the economy is hit by
supply and demand shocks. We also broaden the standard social welfare function to
allow for labor unions to in‡uence policy choices by giving an additional preference
weight to real wages.
We simulate the model using parameter values taken from estimates in standard
macroeconomic models of the labor market and …nd that the optimal monetary policy
varies signi…cantly depending on the labor market institutional setup prevailing in the
economy. As a result, those institutions play a key role in determining the welfare
losses entailed by giving up an independent national monetary policy. However, such
welfare losses also depend on social preferences for in‡ation, unemployment, and real
wages. For instance, while labor adjustment costs seem to decrease welfare as a result
of joining EMU, they are more harmful for societies featuring a high degree of in‡ation
aversion and a low political in‡uence of labor unions. On the other hand, both nominal
and real rigidity may even raise welfare as a result of EMU membership, as long as the
combination of a low degree of in‡ation aversion and politically powerful unions does
not prevail.
Thus, the often-held idea that the more rigidity the higher the cost from joining
EMU is an oversimpli…cation, in the sense that it matters what labor institution we
are talking about, what are the features of other labor market institutions in the
economy, and what are the social preferences. Flexibility is not always a substitute
23for stabilization; it all depends on which variable (e.g. prices vs. employment) society
wants to stabilize and which characteristic of the labor market we are talking about.
In the last part of the paper we adopt a dynamic perspective and discuss the
incentives for reform inside EMU, as opposed to outside it, by assessing the change in
welfare entailed by labor market reformin the two alternatives. We distinguish between
reforms that allow for faster adjustment of the economy to shocks, like reductions in
nominal wage inertia or in employment inertia, and reforms that alter the economy’s
long-run performance, like reductions of rents obtained by insider wage setters. We
again show how the incentives created by EMU with regard to each institution depend
on social preferences. An overall conclusion from our analysis is that it does not
seem generally that Eurosclerosis will increase under EMU, in the sense that more
rigid institutions will be adopted. But the results clearly indicate that big changes in
institutions will be harder to implement. On the other hand, some gradual reforms
toward ‡exibility may be made easier by EMU. Our main conclusion is therefore that
the tendency toward gradualism will be reinforced by EMU membership.
Finally, as argued at various places in the paper, a natural way to regain the ben-
e…ts of an adequate monetary stance along the transition path to a new steady state,
following a structural reform, is simply to put together a coordinated reform package
across several members of the union, with the ECB implementing the optimal transi-
tional monetary policy at the European level. This allows the two-handed approach to
be implemented at the Union level instead of the national level.
24Appendix 1. How to solve the model
This appendix provides details on the steps that are needed in order to solve the
model. The model’s equations are given by:
yt = ±(et ¡ pt) + "t
yt = lt + h + µt
pt = wt ¡ µt ¡ h + ¸(lt ¡ lt¡1) + ¯¸(lt ¡ Etlt+1)
wt = (1 ¡®)(q + (1 ¡')pt + 'et + °lt) + ®(wt¡1 + pt¡1 ¡ pt¡2)
and we shall use the notation introduced in the text: !t = wt¡pt for the real (product)
wage, xt = et ¡ pt for the real exchange rate, and ¼t = pt ¡ pt¡1 for the in‡ation rate.
As indicated in the text, the long run values of the model’s variables are given by:
¹ l =
(± ¡ ')h ¡ ±q
' + °±
; ¹ ! = h; ¹ x =
(1 + °)h ¡ q
' + °±
; and ¹ y = ±
(1 + °)h ¡ q
' + °±
The in‡ation rate is equal to the exogenous trend of nominal depreciation, which
we assume is equal to zero. Thus, ¹ ¼ = 0 and the price level is indeterminate unless
there is a nominal anchor.
A Optimal monetary policy without a monetary
union
Throughout this appendix we solve only for the case where policymakers can credibly
commit on the optimal policy, thereby neglecting the issues highlighted by the credi-
bility literature. We make a change of variable, expressing policy in terms of the real
exchange rate rather than the nominal one. Thus policy is characterized by:
^ xt = x0^ lt¡1 + x1^ !t¡1 + x2^ ¼t¡1 + x3"t + x4µt
The model’s equations can be rewritten so that only real variables and the in‡ation
rate appear, namely:
^ yt = ±^ xt + "t
^ yt = ^ lt + µt
0 = ^ !t ¡ µt + ¸
³
^ lt ¡^ lt¡1
´
+ ¯¸(^ lt ¡ Et^ lt+1)
^ !t = (1 ¡ ®)('^ xt + °^ lt) + ®(^ !t¡1 ¡ ^ ¼t + ^ ¼t¡1)
25This allows us to solve the system recursively:
^ yt = y0^ lt¡1 + y1^ !t¡1 + y2^ ¼t¡1 + y3"t + y4µt
^ lt = l0^ lt¡1 + l1^ !t¡1 + l2^ ¼t¡1 + l3"t + l4µt
^ !t = !0^ lt¡1 + !1^ !t¡1 + !2^ ¼t¡1 + !3"t + !4µt
^ ¼t = ¼0^ lt¡1 + ¼1^ !t¡1 + ¼2^ ¼t¡1 + ¼3"t + ¼4µt
where:
y0 = l0 = ±x0; y1 = l1 = ±x1; y2 = l2 = ±x2
y3 = l3 = ±x3 + 1; y4 = ±x4; l4 = ±x4 ¡ 1
and the 10 coe¢cients f!i;¼ig are solution to the linear system:





0 + ±x1!0 + ±x2¼0
i
0 = !1 + ¸±x1(1 + ¯) ¡ ¯¸
h
±
2x0x1 + ±x1!1 + ±x2¼1
i
0 = !2 + ¸±x2(1 + ¯) ¡ ¯¸
h
±
2x0x2 + ±x1!2 + ±x2¼2
i
0 = !3 + ¸(±x3 + 1)(1 + ¯) ¡ ¯¸[±x0(±x3 + 1) + ±x1!3 + ±x2¼3]
0 = !4 ¡ 1 + ¸(±x4 ¡1)(1 + ¯) ¡ ¯¸[±x0(±x4 ¡ 1) + ±x1!4 + ±x2¼4]
!0 = (1 ¡ ®)'x0 + (1 ¡ ®)°±x0 ¡ ®¼0
!1 = (1 ¡ ®)'x1 + (1 ¡ ®)°±x1 ¡ ®¼1 + ®
!2 = (1 ¡ ®)'x2 + (1 ¡ ®)°±x2 ¡ ®¼2 + ®
!3 = (1 ¡ ®)'x3 + (1 ¡ ®)°(±x3 + 1) ¡ ®¼3
!4 = (1 ¡ ®)'x4 + (1 ¡ ®)°(±x4 + 1) ¡ ®¼4:
Welfare
The next step is to compute the policymaker’s welfare function. We de…ne V (^ zt¡1) as:





with ^ zt = (^ lt; ^ !t; ^ ¼t)0 and
Ut = ¡½(wt ¡ (1 ¡')pt ¡'et ¡ $
¤)
2 ¡ (1 ¡ ½)
h
b(¼t)
2 + (1 ¡ b)(lt ¡l
¤)
2i






2 + (1 ¡ b)
³





26Developing it, we see that its expectation may be written as:
Et¡1U(^ zt) = K
¤ + ¤






¤ = ¡½([(1 ¡')¹ ! + '¹ x] ¡ $
¤)




¡½[(1 ¡')!4 + 'x4]
2¾
2









¡(1 ¡ ½)(1 ¡b)
³
¹ l ¡ l
¤
´2














½([(1 ¡ ')¹ ! + '¹ x] ¡ $¤)[(1 ¡')!0 + 'x0] + (1 ¡ ½)(1 ¡ b)
³
¹ l ¡ l¤
´
l0
½([(1 ¡ ')¹ ! + '¹ x] ¡ $¤)[(1 ¡')!1 + 'x1] + (1 ¡ ½)(1 ¡ b)
³
¹ l ¡ l¤
´
l1
½([(1 ¡ ')¹ ! + '¹ x] ¡ $¤)[(1 ¡')!2 + 'x2] + (1 ¡ ½)(1 ¡ b)
³
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The evolution equation of ^ zt is given by:
^ zt = M^ zt¡1 + N´t;




















and ´t is the vector of shocks ´t = ("t;µt)0. V must have the form:
V = K + ¤^ zt¡1 + ^ z
0
t¡1-^ zt¡1
Using the de…nition of U, we can write V in recursive form:




This can be conveniently rewritten as:
K + ¤^ zt¡1 + ^ z
0
t¡1-^ zt¡1 = K
¤ + ¤








K + ¤M^ zt¡1 + ^ z
0
t¡1M
0-M^ zt¡1 + N
0-N ¯ §
´
27where § = E´´0 and ¯ denotes the scalar product of two matrices: A¯B = §i;jaijbij.






























B Equilibrium with a monetary union
In the EMU case we cannot rewrite the model in terms of x;!; and ¼. Instead we have
to use a four-dimensional system in (^ l; ^ !; ^ ¼; ^ p). Belonging to EMU forces an economy
to have a nominal anchor and it therefore precludes the real exchange targeting which
is optimal absent EMU. Thus ^ p reappears since the real exchange rate is, by de…nition,
given by x = ¡p. Let ^ vt = (^ lt; ^ !t; ^ ¼t; ^ pt)0. Then it follows that:
^ vt = A^ vt¡1 + BEt^ vt+1 + C´t
where:
A = Q
¡1 ¹ A;B = Q






1 0 0 ±
¡¸(1 + ¯) ¡1 0 0
¡(1 ¡ ®)° 1 ® (1 ¡ ®)'








0 0 0 0
¡¯¸ 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
3
7 7 7




0 0 0 0
¡¸ 0 0 0
0 ® ® 0
0 0 0 ¡1
3
7 7 7











28This system has the following solution:
^ vt = M
E^ vt¡1 + N
E´t








and N is given by
N




To compute welfare we use the same steps as in the non-EMU case. However, let us
do it with a more compact notation. Equation (9) can be written as:




U0 = ¡½((1 ¡ ')¹ ! + '¹ x ¡ $
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2 ¡ (1 ¡ ½)(1 ¡ b)
³
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3
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30Appendix 2. Calibration of parameters
A Labor market parameters
Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991), hereafter LNJ, estimate for 19 OECD countries
over the period 1969-85 the following price and wage equations:
pt ¡ wt = (1 ¡ ¯
0)(pt¡1 ¡ wt¡1) + ¯0 ¡¯1ut ¡ ¯11¢ut ¡ ¯2¢
2pt
wt ¡ pt = (1 ¡ °
0)(wt¡1 ¡ pt¡1) + °0 ¡ °1ut ¡ °11¢ut ¡°2¢
2pt
where ut denotes the unemployment rate and the remaining symbols are as in the text.
Long-run parameters are given by ¯i = ¯i=(1¡¯
0) and °i = °i=(1¡°0), for i = 0;1;2.
In order to employ their estimated parameters we need to match these equations
to our own price and wage equations, repeated here for convenience:
pt = wt ¡ µt ¡ h + ¸(lt ¡ lt¡1) + ¯¸(lt ¡ Etlt+1)
wt = (1 ¡®)(q + (1 ¡')pt + 'et + °lt) + ®(wt¡1 + pt¡1 ¡ pt¡2)
The correspondence of parameters is established by the variables they are attached
to, but also by the fact that LNJ provide favorable evidence obtained from simple
cross-section regressions of the country-speci…c coe¢cients on several proxies for the
institutional arrangements which should explain them according to the theory.
A. Our parameter for labor adjustment costs, ¸, corresponds to ¯11, the hystere-
sis parameter in the price equation. LNJ present a cross-country regression (p. 420)
where ¯11 is found to be correlated with the share of manufacturing employees with
short tenure (negatively) and with measures of severance pay and notice periods (pos-
itively). The latter two were not signi…cant, but we have estimated a regression of the
same coe¢cients on a newly constructed employment protection variable taken from
Blanchard and Wolfers (1999) obtaining a positively-signed coe¢cient with a t-ratio of
3.4.
B. Our parameter for real wage ‡exibility, °, corresponds to °1, the long-run e¤ect
of unemployment on the real wage. In a cross-country regression (p. 418) °1 is found
to be correlated with unemployment bene…t duration, replacement rates, and dummy
variables for corporatism (negatively), and with the share of manufacturing employees
working in small …rms and dummy variables for employer and union coordination
(positively).
C. Our parameter for nominal wage inertia, ®, corresponds to 1 ¡ °0, the inertia
parameter in the wage equation. This is easily seen by realizing that setting ' = 0 our
wage equation can be rewritten as:
wt ¡ pt = (1 ¡ ®)(q + °lt) + ®(wt¡1 ¡ pt¡1) ¡®¢
2pt
31While straightforward, this bears clari…cation because LNJ actually call °2 the
nominal wage rigidity parameter. Of course, in our model °2 and 1¡°0 coincide. LNJ
present cross-section estimates (p. 429) where °2 is found to be negatively correlated
with the variance of the growth rate of nominal GDP and a dummy variable for the
length of wage contracts, as well as with dummy variables for the degree of indexation
and synchronization of wage contracts (the latter two are not signi…cant). We have
performed the same regression on the coe¢cient 1 ¡ °0, obtaining similar results.
How do we arrive at the values characterizing rigid and ‡exible institutions? We
computed the means for the countries ranked in positions 2 to 7, from highest to lowest,
for the rigid value, and those ranked 13 to 18 for the ‡exible value (respectively ‡exible
and rigid values, in the case of °). This rule was chosen to leave out potential outliers
(countries ranked in positions 1 and 19) and to leave some room in between (countries
ranked 8 to 12). To check the robustness of the parameter values, we applied the
same procedure to the estimates on similar parameters obtained in three other papers
on varying sample periods and countries: Alogoskou…s and Manning (1988), Grubb
(1986), and Newell and Symons (1985) (as reported in LNJ, pp. 454-466).
Table A1 provides a comparison of estimates. The last column contains our con-
sensus estimate. Two features are worth noting. First, the values are quite consistent
across studies. Second, the rankings across countries are not very coincidental, as
indicated by the low correlation coe¢cients shown for each parameter.
B Other parameters
Demand and supply shock variances (¾2
" and ¾2
µ ). We adopt the estimates from
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993). They estimate a bivariate VAR on GDP growth
and in‡ation. Supply and demand shocks are independent by construction. Supply
shocks are allowed to have permanent e¤ects on output levels, while demand shocks are
not. Both have permanent e¤ects on the level of prices. They use annual data on 11
EU countries over the period 1960-88. Estimated standard deviations for supply and
demand shocks are quite similar across countries, both having average values around
2%. For supply the estimates range from 1.2% (France) to 3% (Greece) and for demand
from 1.4% (Germany) to 3.4% (Ireland).
Reduction in demand shock variance (¾2
") due to EMU. Canzoneri et al. (1996)
estimate a VAR for each of 6 OECD countries (Austria, the Netherlands, France, Italy,
Spain and the United Kingdom) vis-a-vis Germany, in output, public spending, and the
exchange rate, and allow for three types of shocks: supply, government spending and
money/…nance. They …nd that money shocks explain on average 33% of the variance
of output which is due to aggregate demand shocks (i.e. government spending plus
money/…nance) over a one-year period.
32Open economy parameters. The real exchange elasticity ± is computed as the
weighted average of the long-run estimated elasticities of exports and imports of man-
ufactured goods with respect to the real exchange, using export and import ratios as
weights. This is then multiplied by the manufacturing share in GDP plus one-half
times the complementary share (since the remaining sectors, notably services, are less
open than manufacturing). The estimated elasticities are for France, Germany, Italy,
and the UK, from Artus and Knight (1984) and correspond to the period 1980-1985.
The price weight ' is simply calibrated by the share of imports in GDP from the OECD
Economic Outlook. These calculations yield a value of ± = ' = 0:2.
In‡ation preference parameter (b). There is surprisingly little evidence on the
weights of in‡ation and unemployment in the central bank’s objective function as
captured in the Barro-Gordon (1983) framework. For the US, some estimates (Favero
and Rovelli, 1999) and calibrations (Rotemberg and Woodford, 1997) suggest that the
weight of unemployment might actually be zero. Broadbent and Barro (1997), on the
other hand, …nd that output surprises have a weight of about one-third as high as
the in‡ation variance. The most comprehensive analysis so far has been carried out
by Lippi (1998, ch. 8), who estimates the objective function for 49 countries over
the period 1965-1992. Transforming his estimates to our metric –they are in terms of
output, rather than employment deviations, and so we use (the inverse of) a common
labor share of 0.67 in the transformation), the estimated value for the in‡ation weight,
b, is 0.63 (s.e.=0.25), while for 22 OECD countries it is 0.74 (s.e.=0.18).
33Table A1. Comparison of estimates of rigid and ‡exible parameters.
Parameters Layard Newell- Grubb Alogosk.- Consensus
et al. Symons Manning
Labor adjustment costs (¸)
Rigid 8.1 10.9 – – 8.00
Flexible 1.0 2.1 – – 1.00
Maximum 14.4 18.2 – –
Minimum -0.2 0.2 – –
Correlation with LNJ 1.0 0.39 – –
Real wage ‡exibility (°) –
Rigid 1.2 0.7 0.9 1.0 1.25
Flexible 8.6 4.5 2.5 8.1 4.00
Maximum 14.5 7.2 6.5 123.0
Minimum 0.7 0.0 0.3 1.1
Correlation with LNJ 1.0 0.78 0.36 0.37
Nominal wage inertia (®)
Rigid 0.82 0.80 – 0.96 0.80
Flexible 0.46 0.51 – 0.72 0.45
Maximum 0.94 0.86 – 0.98
Minimum 0.00 0.32 – 0.56
Correlation with LNJ 1.0 0.27 – 0.22
Note: Correlation coe¢cients calculated with the subsamples of countrieswhich overlap
with the ones included in Layard et al. (1991).
34Appendix 3. Further simulation results
Table A2. E¤ect of EMU on the variance of employment, prices, and real
wages for di¤erent labor institutions (%).
Employ- Real
Labor Institutions ¸ ° ® ment Prices wages
Fully Rigid R R R 0.1 26.8 17.5
Rigid Wage F R R 0.5 5.8 3.6
Scandinavia R F R 0.1 27.0 17.2
United States F F R 0.5 7.1 3.5
Europe R R F 0.0 31.8 10.8
United Kingdom F R F 0.3 11.9 3.2
Japan R F F 0.0 32.1 9.8
Fully Flexible F F F 0.2 15.6 3.0
Average 0.2 19.8 8.6
Labor adjustment costs (¸)
Rigid 0.1 29.4 13.8
Flexible 0.4 10.1 3.3
Di¤erence Rigid-Flexible -0.3 19.3 10.5
Real wage ‡exibility (°)
Rigid 0.2 19.0 8.8
Flexible 0.2 20.5 8.4
Di¤erence Rigid-Flexible 0.1 -1.4 0.4
Nominal wage inertia (®)
Rigid 0.3 16.7 10.5
Flexible 0.1 22.9 6.7
Di¤erence Rigid-Flexible 0.2 -6.2 3.8
Note. The …rst column is found by setting ½ = 0 and b = 0, the second one by setting
½ = 0 and b = 1, and the third one by setting ½ = 1. The bottom panel reports
the average cost for the 4 countries which share the indicated characteristic. Other
parameters: ¯ = 0:9; r = 0:1; ¾2
" = ¾2
µ = 0:0004; q = 0.
35Table A3. E¤ect of labor market institutions and political preferences on
the cost of EMU with reduced demand uncertainty (%).
Union political power
Weak (½=0.1) Powerful (½=0.5)
In‡ation aversion In‡ation aversion
Prone Averse Prone Averse
(b=0.1) (b=0.9) (b=0.1) (b=0.9)
New Conser- Socialist Christian
Labor Institutions ¸ ° ® Labour vative Democrat
Fully Rigid R R R 1.8 11.1 0.9 1.9
Rigid Wage F R R 0.6 3.0 0.2 0.5
Scandinavia R F R 1.8 11.2 0.9 1.9
United States F F R 0.6 3.6 0.2 0.5
Europe R R F 1.6 12.6 0.5 1.7
United Kingdom F R F 0.8 6.3 0.2 0.8
Japan R F F 1.6 12.6 0.5 1.7
Fully Flexible F F F 1.1 10.1 0.2 1.1
Average 1.2 8.8 0.5 1.3
Labor adjustment costs (¸)
Rigid 1.7 11.9 0.7 1.8
Flexible 0.8 5.8 0.2 0.7
Di¤. Rigid-Flexible 0.9 6.1 0.5 1.1
Real wage ‡exibility (°)
Rigid 1.2 8.3 0.5 1.2
Flexible 1.3 9.4 0.5 1.3
Di¤. Rigid-Flexible -0.1 -1.1 0.01 -0.1
Nominal wage inertia (®)
Rigid 1.2 7.2 0.6 1.2
Flexible 1.3 10.4 0.4 1.3
Di¤. Rigid-Flexible -0.1 -3.2 0.2 -0.1
Notes. The cost of EMU measures the welfare cost, according to welfare function (5)
in the text, of moving from the optimal parameters xi to xi = 0 for all i. All costs are
normalized by the steady-state welfare corresponding to the speci…c political preference
parameter pair and in percentage terms. The bottom panel reports the average cost for
the 4 countries which share the indicated characteristic. Other parameters: ¯ = 0:9;
r = 0:1; ¾2
" = 0:00027; ¾2
µ = 0:0004; q = 0.
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40Table 1. Parameter set for labor market institutions.
Labor market institutions
Labor Real wage Nominal
adj. costs ‡exibility wage inertia
Degree of ‡exibility (¸) (°) (®)
Rigid 8.00 1.25 0.80
Flexible 1.00 4.00 0.45
Note: Values chosen according to several empirical studies (see Appendix 2).
Table 2. Virtual economies according to parameter con…gurations for
labor market institutions.
Labor market institutions
Labor Real wage Nominal
adj. costs ‡exibility wage inertia
Country (¸) (°) (®)
Fully Rigid R R R
Rigid Wages F R R
Scandinavia R F R
United States F F R
Europe R R F
United Kingdom F R F
Japan R F F
Fully Flexible F F F
Table 3. Space generated by policy preference parameters.
In‡ation aversion
Prone Averse
Union political power (b = 0:1) (b = 0:9)
Weak (½ = 0:1) New Labour Conservative
Strong (½ = 0:5) Socialist Christian Democrat
41Table 4. E¤ect of labor market institutions and political preferences on
the cost of EMU (%).
Union political power
Weak (½=0.1) Powerful (½=0.5)
In‡ation aversion In‡ation aversion
Prone Averse Prone Averse
(b=0.1) (b=0.9) (b=0.1) (b=0.9)
New Conser- Socialist Christian
Labor Institutions ¸ ° ® Labour vative Democrat
Fully Rigid R R R 3.5 21.0 1.8 3.7
Rigid Wage F R R 1.0 4.5 0.3 0.7
Scandinavia R F R 3.5 21.2 1.7 3.7
United States F F R 1.1 5.5 0.3 0.8
Europe R R F 3.1 24.0 1.1 3.4
United Kingdom F R F 1.3 8.9 0.3 1.2
Japan R F F 3.1 24.2 1.0 3.4
Fully Flexible F F F 1.5 11.6 0.4 1.5
Average 2.3 15.1 0.9 2.3
Labor adjustment costs (¸)
Rigid 3.3 22.6 1.4 3.5
Flexible 1.2 7.6 0.3 1.1
Di¤. Rigid-Flexible 2.1 15.0 1.1 2.5
Real wage ‡exibility (°)
Rigid 2.2 14.6 0.9 2.3
Flexible 2.3 15.6 0.9 2.3
Di¤. Rigid-Flexible -0.1 -1.0 0.0 -0.1
Nominal wage inertia (®)
Rigid 2.3 13.1 1.1 2.2
Flexible 2.3 17.2 0.7 2.4
Di¤. Rigid-Flexible 0.0 -4.1 0.3 -0.1
Notes. The cost of EMU measures the welfare cost, according to welfare function
(5) in the text, of moving from the optimal parameters xi to the parameters xi = 0
for all i. All costs are normalized by the steady-state welfare corresponding to the
speci…c political preference parameter con…guration and in percentage terms. The
bottom panel reports the average cost for the 4 countries which share the indicated
characteristic. Other parameters: ¯ = 0:9; r = 0:1; ¾2
" = ¾2
µ = 0:0004; q = 0.
42Table 5. E¤ect of labor market institutions on the cost of EMU.
A. By policymaker’s individual objectives:
Stabilize:
Labor institution Prices Employment Real wage
Employment protection (¸) + – +
Real wage rigidity (1=°) – + +
Nominal wage inertia (®) – + +
B. By combinations of objectives:
Union political power
Weak (½=0.1) Powerful (½=0.5)
In‡ation aversion In‡ation aversion
Prone Averse Prone Averse
(b=0.1) (b=0.9) (b=0.1) (b=0.9)
New Conser- Socialist Christian
Labor institution Labour vative Democrat
Employment protection (¸) + + + +
Real wage rigidity (1=°) – – + –
Nominal wage inertia (®) + – + –
Note: Panel A: A ”+” (respectively ”–”) sign indicates that a more rigid institution
increases (respectively reduces) the costs from EMU membership when the policymak-
er’s objective is to stabilize the variable in the corresponding column. Source: Table
A2. Panel B: E¤ect of each labor institution on the cost of EMU for each combination
of policymaker’s preferences. Source: Table 4.
Table 6. E¤ect of EMU on the incentives to reduce insiders’ rents (q).
Cost of EMU Cost of EMU E¤ect of EMU
without reform with reform on incentives (I)
Country (1) (2) (1) – (2)
Fully Flexible 7.9 10.9 -3.0
Europe 15.9 16.3 -0.4
Note: Percentage costs of EMU, computed for a reform consisting of a reduction from
q = 0 to q = ¡0:1. For Fully Flexible, ¸ = 1;° = 4, and ® = 0:45; for Europe,
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Figure 1: Dynamic response of employment and the real wage to a reduction in insider
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Figure 2: Dynamic response of the price level to a reduction in insider rents (q) in
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Figure 3: Dynamic response of the exchange rate and the price level to a reduction in
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Figure 4: Dynamic response of the real exchange rate to a reduction in insider rents
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Employment Real wage
Figure 5: Dynamic response of employment and the real wage to a reduction in insider
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Figure 6: Dynamic response of employment to a reduction in insider rents (q) in and
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Figure 7: Dynamic response of the exchange rate to a reduction in insider rents (q)
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Figure 8: Dynamic response of the real wage to a reduction in insider rents (q) in and
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Figure 9: Dynamic response of the price level to a reduction in insider rents (q) in and
outside EMU. ”European” economy.
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